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1. Introduction
Legislative Decree 3/20171, finally transposing Directive 2014/104/EU, 
concludes a tortuous path aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of com-
petition law in Italy through a “two point” system in which public and 
private enforcement represent complementary means that share the same 
purpose2.
The ultimate objective of the Directive is clearly outlined: to guarantee 
the effet utile of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, allowing anyone, including 
consumers, businesses and public entities, to request compensation for 
damages suffered following an antitrust violation3 before national judges.
In order to do so, it has been necessary to define a system consistent with 
the European tradition regarding civil responsibility, where compensation 
damages are finalised at eminently reparatory functions and the burden of 
proof is laid on the damaged party. 
The policy and legal choices undertaken are, however, not so straight-
forward. While some solutions lean towards the sign of novelty (from the 
binding nature of the decisions ascertaining a violation, to the introduc-
tion of the powerful system of assumptions, to the alleviation of the bur-
den of allegations, to the “passing on” rules, and further, to the new role 
given to competition authorities, and the provisions regarding ordinance 
matters)4, others, the provision on legal privilege included, hinge towards 
1 Legislative Decree of 19 January 2017, no. 3, GU no. 15, 19-01-2017.
2 For an analysis, Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, 
nessuno o centomila? XVI. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o centomila?, 
no. 2 (2017), ed. Valeria Falce, Federico Ghezi and Gustavo Olivieri.
3 See Recital 3 of the European Parliament and of Council Directive 2014/104/EU, of November 
26th 2013.
4 Andrea Pezzoli and Gianluca Sepe, “‘Public’ e ‘private enforcement’: c’è danno e danno”, Analisi 
giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o centomila? 
XVI, no. 2 (2017); Philipp Fabbio, “Note sull’efficacia nel giudizio civile delle decisioni delle 
autorità della concorrenza nazionali dopo il ‘Decreto enforcement’ (d.lgs. 19 gennaio 2017, no. 3)”, 
Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o cen-
tomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017); Gabriella Muscolo, “La prova nelle azioni di risarcimento dei danni anti-
trust”, Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o 
centomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017); Marco Saverio Spolidoro and Teresa F.F. Spolidoro, “Profitto illecito 
e risarcimento del danno antitrust”, Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e 
all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o centomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017); Gaetano Presti, “Spunti generali 
dal microsistema della solidarietà nella disciplina del danno da concorrenza”, Analisi giuridica 
dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o centomila? XVI, no. 
2 (2017); Marco Francesco Campagna, “La responsabilità solidale incalcolabile dell’illecito anti-
trust”, Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o 
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the sign of strict continuity with the acquis communitaire5. Moving from 
such assumption, in the following, the European and national provisions 
on the legal privilege will be analysed with the aim to verify whether the 
Italian transposition opens the door to a broader domain and scope of 
application on such matter.
2. The rise and codification of legal privilege 
In order to protect and guarantee legal privilege, the Directive provides a 
specific rule. 
Article 5, paragraph 6, leaves Member States free to give full effect to 
applicable legal professional privilege under Union or national law when 
ordering the disclosure of evidence. 
The littera of Article 5, rather than advancing full convergence among 
Member States, opts for a policy choice renewing the Community acquis 
and confirming national principles. 
Such solution could appear a sign of weakness. Though this is not the 
case, considering that legal privilege as such has not yet been considered 
worth of a Community position6. Through a two-phase process, the Court 
of Justice instead was in charge of advancing a common culture7. 
centomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017); Nicola Infante, “‘Leniency’ e diritto di accesso: un difficile contemper-
amento di interessi”, Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. 
Uno, nessuno o centomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017); Enrico Fabrizi, “I ‘litigation founders’ e le azioni di 
risarcimento del danno da illecito antitrust”, Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concor-
renza e all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o centomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017).
5 For an overview, Valeria Falce, “Riservatezza delle comunicazioni e ‘Legal Privilege’ tra regolazi-
one europea e recepimento nazionale”, Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e 
all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o centomila? XVI, no.2 (2017): 469.
6 At International level too, legal privilege was not worth of specific attention until a very recent 
revirement: “Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement: Executive Summary of 
the roundtable on the treatment of legally privileged information in competition proceedings, 
Annex to the Summary Record of the 128th meeting of Working Party No 3. on Co-operation 
and Enforcement, 26 November 2018”, OECD, 2018. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/
WP3/M(2018)2/ANN2/FINAL/en/pdf.
7 On the foundations, Eric Gippini-Fournier, “Legal professional privilege in competition pro-
ceedings before the European Commission: Beyond the cursory glance”, in Annual Proceedings of 
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute – International Antitrust Law and Policy, ed. Barry E. Hawk 
(USA: Juris Publishing, 2005), 587. On a framing, Christine E. Parker, Robert E. Rosen and Vibeke 
L. Nielsen, “The two faces of lawyers: Professional ethics and business compliance with regula-
tion”, Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 (2009): 201.
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Initially, it identified the “heart” of the notion of legal privilege and ele-
vated it to a principle of law through a process of “bottom-up integration”8 
in which its lawfulness derived from the common norms and principles 
and constitutional legal traditions of the Member States9.
A fundamental stage of this process is the sentence of Transocean Marine 
Paint in 197410, where the Court of Justice recognised, after having exam-
ined the fundamental legal traditions of each Member State, that “the right 
to a fair hearing falls within the rights pursuant to article 164 of the Treaty 
and which the Court must guarantee its obedience”.
Subsequent jurisprudence was moulded on such notion, recognising 
the full citizenship of the principle of legal privilege in the community 
law11 and immediately linking the principle of legal privilege to the right of 
defence (in the forms and outlines further discussed)12.
8 See M.J. Frese, “The development of general principles for EU competition law enforcement – 
the protection of legal professional privilege”, European Competition Law Review 32, no. 4 (2011): 
198-202.
9 The “creeping legal integration” mechanism has enabled the European courts to recognise a num-
ber of ‘unwritten’ legal principles on the basis of Article 19 TEU, which, in ensuring that the law 
is respected in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, allows the Courts of the Union 
to take account of principles not expressly enshrined in the Treaties themselves but commonly 
recognised in the national legal systems of the Member States [Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
(See Judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Mbh v. Einfuhrund 
Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, C-11/70, EU:C:1970:114) and Nold (See Judgment of 14 
May 1974, Nold, Kohlen-Und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-4/73, EU:C:1974:51)]. 
10 See Judgment of 23 October 1974, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the 
European Communities, C-17/74, EU:C:1974:106.
11 According to European judges, in fact, “However, it is clear to the domestic legal systems of the 
Member States that there are common criteria, inasmuch as those legal systems protect, under 
similar conditions, the confidentiality of correspondence between lawyer and client, [...] In those 
circumstances, Regulation No. 17/62 must be interpreted as meaning that it also protects the con-
fidentiality of correspondence between lawyer and client under those conditions, thereby trans-
posing the constituent elements of that protection common to the rights of the Member States”. 
This approach has been widely shared by the case law of the EDU Court itself: see Jussila v. Finland 
(2006) Application no. 73053/01, in which the Court has come to recognize the scope of applica-
tion of Article 6 ECHR also in antitrust proceedings; see Nella causa A. Menarini Diagnostics 
S.R.L. v. Italia (2011), Application no. 43509/08, in which the Court recognised the compatibility 
of a national antitrust procedure with the Convention pursuant to art. 6, provided, of course, that 
the person concerned has the possibility of challenging any decision taken against him before a 
competent court.
12 Thus in the recent European Commission, Communication on the protection of confidential 
information for the private enforcement of EU competition law by national courts, July, 2019 (https://
ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2019_private_enforcement/en.pdf), the European 
Commission makes it clear that nothing in this Communication should be interpreted as allow-
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3. Areas and limits
In particular, under Community law, the “correspondence exchanged 
in the interest of the right to a defence of the client” shall be protected 
in so far it has anchored the benefit of legal privilege to the commu-
nications between businesses and the appointed lawyers13 commencing 
from the moment in which the antitrust trial has begun, to then include 
that which preceded it should it present connecting elements to the sub-
ject of the trial, broadening to internal notes (which merely reproduce 
legal communications and judgments coming from the lawyer14), to also 
ing the disclosure of evidence protected under the legal professional privilege, i.e., the principle of 
confidentiality of communications between a legal representative and their client (Article 5(6) of 
the Damages Directive; see also, Judgment of 18 May 1982, AM & S Europe v. Commission of the 
European Communities, Case 155/79, EU:C:1982:157, and Judgment of 14 September 2010, Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v. European Commission, C-550/07-P, EU:C:2010:512).
13 The first step in this jurisprudential process is the ruling of the Court of Justice AM & S of 1982 
(Judgment of 18 May 1982, AM & S Europe v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 
155/79, EU:C:1982:157), in which the judges set the benchmarks in so far as they considered that 
(paragraph 21) “Apart from these differences, however, there are to be found in the national laws 
of the member states common criteria inasmuch as those laws protect, in similar circumstances, 
the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client provided that, on the 
one hand, such communications are made for the purposes and in the interests of the client’s 
rights of defence and, on the other hand, they emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say , 
lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment”. By that route, the Court 
has come to the conclusion that the protection covers all correspondence exchanged between an 
undertaking and a lawyer since the opening of the proceedings, as well as earlier correspondence 
which is connected with the subject-matter of the proceedings and which has been received or 
sent by independent lawyers qualified to practice in one of the Member States. This approach was 
subsequently reaffirmed by the Court of First Instance of the European Union in the Hilti order of 
1990 (Order of 4 April 1990, Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission of the European Communities, 
T-30/89, EU:T:1990:27), according to which (paragraph 13) “Regulation No 17 of the Council of 6 
February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (OJ 1962 13, p. 204), 
must be interpreted as protecting the confidentiality of correspondence between lawyer and cli-
ent provided, first, that it is correspondence exchanged within the framework and in the interests 
of the client’s right of defence and, second, that it comes from independent lawyers, that is to say, 
lawyers who are not bound to the client by an employment relationship”.
14 In the Hilti case (Order of 4 April 1990, Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission of the European 
Communities, T-30/89, EU:T:1990:27), the Judge specified at paragraph 18 “In this case it appears 
that that legal advice was reported on in internal notes distributed within the undertaking so that 
it might be the subject of consideration by managerial staff. In such a case, and although the afore-
said legal advice was not received by way of correspondence, it must be held that the principle of 
the protection of written communications between lawyer and client may not be frustrated on the 
sole ground that the content of those communications and of that legal advice was reported in 
documents internal to the undertaking Thus the principle of the protection of written communi-
cations between lawyer and client must, in view of its purpose, be regarded as extending also to the 
internal notes which are confined to reporting the text or the content of those communications It 
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include the preparatory documents edited exclusively in order to request 
a legal opinion15.
By contrast, the same case-law has ruled out that the protection of privi-
lege extends to the facts which are the subject matter of communications 
between lawyer and client, which can therefore be used as evidence and 
may be relied on against the person subject to the proceedings if they have 
become known in another way.
As for the persons to whom the privilege applies, the Community Courts 
have adhered to a restrictive stance, limiting the reach of action to corre-
spondence with the externally hired lawyer which in this capacity par-
ticipates in the administrations of justice, but not to that with the internal 
lawyer (so called in-house lawyer). This is because, according to established 
guidelines, 1) the exchange would not take place to the benefit of the right 
of defence of the client, but rather on the basis on an employment relation-
ship; 2) being subject to ethical rules does not preclude the risk of conflicts 
of interest and would not ensure full “independence” with respect to the 
company.
In short, it would not be sufficient for a lawyer to be enrolled in a 
professional register, and thus subject to relative constraints and sanc-
tions in order to guarantee his independence. The independence and 
follows that the request for confidential treatment made by the applicant must be allowed in so far 
as it refers to those documents”.
15 See Judgment of 17 September 2007, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v. 
Commission of the European Communities, T- 125/2003 e T- 253/2003, T:2007:287, paragraphs 122 
and 123, in which it was specified that “a person may be able effectively to consult a lawyer without 
constraint, and so that the latter may effectively perform his role as collaborating in the adminis-
tration of justice by the courts and providing legal assistance for the purpose of the effective exer-
cise of the rights of the defence, it may be necessary, in certain circumstances, for the client to pre-
pare working documents or summaries, in particular as a means of gathering information which 
will be useful, or essential, to that lawyer for an understanding of the context, nature and scope 
of the facts for which his assistance is sought. Preparation of such documents may be particularly 
necessary in matters involving a large amount of complex information, as is often the case with 
procedures imposing penalties for breaches of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC. In those circumstances, 
the Court holds that the fact that the Commission reads such documents during an investigation 
may well prejudice the rights of the defence of the undertaking under investigation and the public 
interest in ensuring that every client is able to consult his lawyer without constraint.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that such preparatory documents, even if they were not 
exchanged with a lawyer or were not created for the purpose of being sent physically to a lawyer, 
may none the less be covered by LPP, provided that they were drawn up exclusively for the purpose 
of seeking legal advice from a lawyer in exercise of the rights of the defence. On the other hand, 
the mere fact that a document has been discussed with a lawyer is not sufficient to give it such 
protection.”.
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impartiality of the judgment could, in fact, be compromised by the exist-
ence of a “connection”16, by a type of employment relationship, or by the 
continuous and stable remuneration connected to it17.
Privilege works within these limits, which, as was reiterated in the case 
of Akzo Nobel in 2007 and in the Communication of the Commission 
on best practices in proceedings under articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, 
consists, on the one hand, in the prohibition for the lawyer to reveal the 
content of protected communication and, on the other, for the legal and 
administrative authorities to acquire or use such information without the 
consent of the subject undergoing trial – becoming therefore, eligible for 
inadmissibility18.
16 At paragraph 21 of the Judgment of 18 May 1982, AM & S Europe v. Commission of the European 
Communities, Case 155/79, EU:C:1982:157: “Apart from these differences, however, there are to be 
found in the national laws of the member states common criteria inasmuch as those laws protect, 
in similar circumstances, the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and cli-
ent provided that, on the one hand, such communications are made for the purposes and in the 
interests of the client’s rights of defence and, on the other hand, they emanate from independent 
lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.”
17 At paragraph 24 of the Judgment of 18 May 1982, AM & S Europe v. Commission of the European 
Communities, Case 155/79, EU:C:1982:157: “As regards the second condition, it should be stated 
that the requirement as to the position and status as an independent lawyer, which must be fulfilled 
by the legal adviser from whom the written communications which may be protected emanate, is 
based on a conception of the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of justice by the 
courts and as being required to provide, in full independence, and in the overriding interests of 
that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs. The counterpart of that protection lies in the 
rules of professional ethics and discipline which are laid down and enforced in the general interest 
by institutions endowed with the requisite powers for that purpose. Such a conception reflects the 
legal traditions common to the member states and is also to be found in legal order of the com-
munity, as is demonstrated by article 17 of the Protocols on the Statutes of the Court of Justice of 
the EEC and the EAEC, and also by article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice 
of the ECSC”.
18 With the aim, on the one hand, of codifying the solutions adopted by the practice when apply-
ing the rules set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and, on the other hand, of innovating opera-
tional practices in antitrust matters in an attempt to strengthen the guarantees deriving from the 
principle of defence of the parties subject to the investigation procedure, the Commission con-
sidered to extend the protection of the privilege to the inspection phase, excluding the possibility 
of acquiring and using communications between the client and the lawyer which are covered by 
professional secrecy as they relate to the right of defence. Therefore, the undertaking subject to 
inspection is entitled to claim protection of the LP, being able to provide the Commission with 
all appropriate and relevant justification in this respect. If the Commission considers that such 
evidence is not sufficient or has been refused by the undertaking subject to the inspection, it may 
order the production of the document and, if necessary, impose penalties or periodic penalty pay-
ments for delay or denial of production. As a general rule, recognition of the confidential nature 
of the communications between lawyer and client in the course of the inspection procedure takes 
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Now, faced with the uncertain language used within article 5 (“full 
guarantee”, “privacy” and “communication between lawyer and client”), it 
is clear that the regulation does not intend to recognise the benefit of total 
or partial confidential treatment, thus the total or partial inaccessibility 
of it to third parties. Rather, it is intended to sanction the inadmissibility 
in proceedings, with the consequence that, if the correspondence is pro-
duced, it must be returned and may not be viewed or otherwise used. 
In other words, the privacy referred to in article 5, paragraph 6, is diverse 
from the privacy intended by other regulations which, instead, exclude 
third party access to trade or industry secrets, commercial know-how, and 
all other business or sensitive information whose disclosure would most 
likely produce significant economic damages.19
On the national front, instead, specific distinctive elements remain, 
which, as mentioned previously, the Directive hastens to recognise and 
protect. In fact, depending on the system of reference, the notion of legal 
privilege tends to be allowed to enter into the more ample and broad area 
of right to privacy and confidentiality, now within the scope of the right of 
defence as a corollary of the right to be heard intended to be an expression 
of the principle of fair trial20. In particular:
1. The first reconstructive hypothesis rests on a so-called “internal” 
foundation, relating to the right of each person to maintain a space 
place against what are the extrinsic characteristics of the document. However, it may happen that 
the company may refuse to allow the inspectors to examine the extrinsic features of the document. 
This can only be the case if the company justifies its refusal on the basis of appropriate reasons why 
it would be impossible to consider that, despite a rough examination, the content of the document 
cannot be detected. Indeed, if, during the course of the investigation, DG Competition considers 
that the material submitted by the undertaking is not capable of demonstrating that the documen-
tation in question is protected by the LP because the undertaking refused to subject it to a rough 
examination of the extrinsic elements, officials may still extract a copy and keep it in a sealed enve-
lope with a view to a subsequent settlement of the dispute. On the other hand, in cases where the 
company has claimed protection of confidentiality and has provided valid reasons to substantiate 
its claims, the Commission will not proceed with the reading of the contents of the documenta-
tion before it has adopted a rejection decision on the matter, which can also be challenged by the 
company concerned: See John Temple Lang, “The strengths and weakness of the DG Competition 
Manual of Procedure”, The Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, no. 1 (2013).
19 In the light of this, the rule renews for tabulas a principle acquired in Community law, i.e. guar-
anteeing the benefit of secrecy to industrial and commercial secrets, on the one hand, and that of 
restitution to communications between lawyer and client on the other.
20 See Giuseppe Morgese, “La tutela del legale privilege nel diritto comunitario della concorrenza”, 
Studi sull’integrazione europea III, no. 2 (2008): 317.
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of personal freedom, protected from harassment by public authori-
ties, in order to express their own personality. This reconstruction 
is completed by the “external” foundation, aimed at protecting the 
rights of the individual to create and develop social relationships 
with other individuals. Thus declined, Legal Privilege becomes a 
part of the broader right to privacy because of the guarantees21 and 
specific protective tools22 put forth to maintain the fiduciary rela-
tionship between a client and his lawyer away from arbitrary forms 
of harassment by the public authorities23.
2. According to the second line of inquiry, the guarantee of legal privi-
lege is rather a corollary of the principle of the right of defence24 and 
to a fair trial (on such point see the sentence of November 28, 1991 S. 
v. Switzerland25, Niemietz v. Germany) and, as such, is connected to 
the more general right of every individual against self-incrimination 
21 In particular with Niemietz v. Germany (1992), Application no. 13710/88, and Petri Sallinen and 
Others v. Finland (2005), Application no. 50882/99, the Court stated that respect for private life 
also includes the right of the individual to maintain and develop social relationships with others. 
In these terms, the European courts have stated that interpreting concepts of “private life” and 
“domicile”, including premises or professional activities, serve the essential purpose pursuant art. 
8 ECHR, i.e. to safeguard the individual from arbitrary interference by public authorities.
22 See Marco Stramaglia, “Il sequestro di documenti informatici: quale tutela per il segreto pro-
fessionale forense?”, Il Diritto dell’Informazione e dell’Informatica 24, no. 6 (2008): 831-847. See 
also the EDU Court, Andrè and Another v. France (2008), Application no. 18603/03, in which the 
areas and limits within which it can be considered necessary and legitimate the interference of this 
right by the public authorities, pursuant to art. 8, par. 2, ECHR, without violating the professional 
secrecy, affirming that in the hypothesis of searches and home visits to law offices, the internal 
systems must imperatively guarantee specific instruments of protection.
23 See Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GMBH v. Austria (2008), Application no. 74336/01, in which 
the Court found that the search of a computer and the seizure of documents at a law firm constitute 
an infringement of Article 7(1) of the EC Treaty. 8 ECHR if in the analysis of the digital pleadings 
the appropriate guarantees to ensure effective and concrete protection of professional secrecy are 
not respected (in the present case, the transactions had been carried out without the representative 
of the Forensic Council exercising effective control, the seizure report had not been drawn up at 
the end of the transactions and the person concerned had not been given timely information about 
the seized computer documents). 
24 See Morgese, “La tutela”, 318. From this point of view, the reconduction of the legal privilege in 
the bedrock of the right to privacy would not be correct, implying the overlapping and confusion 
of two cases - that of the protection of the lawyer-client communications and that of the protection 
of the confidentiality of communications in general - which, for presuppositions, fields of applica-
tion and purposes appear different. 
25 See S. v. Switzerland (1991), Application no. 12629/87; 13965/88. 
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(see the sentence of Heaney and McGuiness v. Ireland26; and the sen-
tence of Saunders v. United Kingdom27). 
Now, the implications connected to this double reconstruction are far 
from negligible. First of all, because where legal privilege is ascribed to 
the right to broader privacy, the functional orientation of a correspond-
ence that is specifically intended for the exercise of the right of defence is 
lost, and then, according to a certain interpretation of jurisprudence, the 
connection to the autonomy and independence and the third party nature 
of the lawyer, which constitutes – as I will shall soon mention – one of 
the pillars around which the reasoning followed by the Court of Justice 
regarding the notion of legal privilege revolves (Bicos Beteiligungen GMBH 
v. Austria, Foxley v. United Kingdom28, Andrè and others v. France). 
Restricting ourselves to a few examples, in certain jurisdictions, such as 
Italy, the benefit of legal privilege is covered under the right to a defence29 
and conforms to the Community model with the consequence that, due to 
the relationship of subordination, communications with in-house lawyers 
remain outside the range of its coverage. Although it was recommended 
by the European Parliament as early as 1962, during the preparatory work 
of Law 17/62 regarding control of operations of concentration between 
companies: “protection of the professional privilege without differentiat-
ing between company lawyers and lawyers in private practice”30, pursuant 
to article 3 of the professional forensic law31, the dependent relationship 
qualifies as a cause of incompatibility with respect to membership in a 
professional association of lawyers, with the consequence that, even when 
26 See Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland (2000), Application no. 34720/97.
27 See Saunders v. United Kingdom (1996), Application no. 19187/91. 
28 See Foxley v. The United Kingdom (2000), Application no. 33274/96. 
29 The protection of the confidentiality of communications between lawyer-client is confirmed 
by certain regulatory provisions, mainly penalistic, which, on the one hand, recognize forms of 
protection against disclosure obligations and the acquisition of information relevant to the forma-
tion of evidence during a legal proceeding (see p.e. art. 199 and 200 of the Italian Code of Penal 
Procedure), and, on the other hand, express the prohibition to access and use evidence (unless it 
constitutes the body of the crime) relating to conversations or communications between the per-
son subject to the proceedings and his lawyer (see art. 103 of the Italian Code of Penal Procedure).
30 The reference is clearly to Regulation No 17/62, the first regulation issued by the Council in 
implementation of art. 85 and 86 (now art. 81 and 82) of the EEC Treaty in the field of competition, 
in OJ No. 13 on February 21st 1962, p. 204/62.
31 See article 3, paragraph 4, letter b) of R.d.l. no. 1578 on November 27th 1933, converted into Law 
no. 36 on January 22nd 1934.
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authorised to practice law, in-house lawyers are not entitled to register 
with a professional association of lawyers (if registered, they must cancel 
membership) and are thus free from any obligation of privacy in the strict-
est sense32. 
In other States, such as in France, there is a broader cone of shade from 
the point of view of the individual, so much that in-house lawyer com-
munications, since they are registered in the professional association of 
lawyers, are protected as professional secrets and bound by professional 
secrecy, and in this way independence and impartiality are ensured.
Even from an objective point of view, the disparities are profound. In 
some jurisdictions, such as in Italy, the alignment with the Community 
model is such that all correspondence with outside counsel that is func-
tionally linked to an ongoing proceeding is excluded from the file33 relat-
ing to antitrust proceedings. In others, however, such as common law 
countries, the dilation that we find is from a functional perspective, in the 
sense that documents and materials requested by the lawyer about anyone 
in function or even solemnly in the hypothesis of a trial occurring are 
treated confidentially34. 
32 Moreover, the A.I.G.I. code of conduct (see article 6 A.I.G.I. Code of Conduct available at www.
aigi.it), states that “the business lawyer is bound to professional secrecy and must treat all the 
information he/she comes into possession by reason of his/hers profession as strictly confidential, 
even after the employment relationship has ended”, 72. It goes without saying that business lawyers 
have, above all, the duties of confidentiality established by the type of employment relationship 
that binds them to the company to which they belong. Extensively on such matter, see Ermanno 
Cappa, “La figura del giurista d’impresa”, in “Le professioni intellettuali tra decoro e mercato”, 
Analisi giuridica dell’economia, Le professioni intellettuali tra decoro e mercato IV, no. 1 (2005). 
33 On the other hand, according to article 622 of the Italian Penal Code: “Whoever, having knowl-
edge, for reasons of his state, office, profession, art, or secret, takes it over, without just cause, or uses 
it for his own or others profit, shall be punished, if the act may result in harm, with imprisonment 
of up to one year or a fine ranging from 30 to 516 euros”. On professional secrecy and abstention, 
see, Domenico Borghesi, “Il segreto nella professione legale”, Rassegna Forense 3 (2008): 354 ss.
34 The OECD (see footnote no. 6) has recently confirmed that “The recognition of legal privilege 
depends on each jurisdiction’s legal culture and history. It involves a trade-off between two public 
policy objectives: on the one hand, the public interest in the effectiveness of antitrust investigations 
and decisions, and, on the other, the parties’ rights of defence, legal representation and uncon-
strained access to legal advice”. For an European overview, see Wouter P. J. Wils, “Legal profes-
sional privilege in EU antitrust enforcement: Law, policy & procedure”, World Competition: Law 
and Economics Review 42, no. 1 (2019): 21-42, also in King’s College London Law School Research 
Paper No. 19-9. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3281576; Wouter P. J. Wils, “EU antitrust enforcement 
powers and procedural rights and guarantees: The interplay between EU law, national law, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights”, 
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Broadening the analysis to OECD countries, it has been recently con-
firmed that at international level 34 OECD Members recognise legal pro-
fessional privilege in law enforcement and protect confidential communi-
cations between clients and their legal advisors from forced disclosure. In 
a 2018 Roundtable, it emerged that “the privilege can be asserted against 
public authorities, third parties and courts, in order to oppose access to 
documents, as well as challenge actions and decisions that have relied on 
information that should have been privileged. In competition law enforce-
ment, questions of privilege and protection of privileged information from 
disclosure may arise during investigations by competition authorities as 
well as in competition litigation”35. As far as in-house counsels are con-
cerned, 19 OECD countries extend the legally privileged protection to 
communications between clients and their in-house lawyers. 
4. Continuity and novelty in regard to the acquis communitaire
From the foregoing it would seem possible to conclude that the Directive 
does not introduce any novelty with respect to the evolutionary lines of 
case-law, limiting itself on the one hand to codifying a principle that has 
already been confirmed and, on the other, to preserve the quid proprium of 
national legislation, always in the wake of Community case-law. 
However, a more careful reading of the provision and, especially, its sys-
tematic framing warrants a more cautious and certainly more problematic 
attitude.
First, the English version of article 5, paragraph 6, does not refer corre-
spondence with the lawyer, nor does it evoke the characteristics of privacy, 
but requires at full effect the protection of applicable legal professional 
privilege, which broadens the scope of application to other individuals and 
further documentation. Even more multifaceted is the French version of 
the same provision, which makes no reference to the rules of legal privi-
lege, nor to the guarantee of a confidentiality regime. 
Rather, it invokes the need to ensure the useful effect of the protection of 
professional secrecy, which is a different and broader concept than that of 
World Competition: Law and Economics Review 34, no. 2 (2017), also in Concurrences, May 2011, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759209.
35 Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement: Executive Summary of the roundta-
ble on the treatment of legally privileged information in competition proceedings, Annex to the 
Summary Record of the 128th meeting of Working Party No 3. on Co-operation and Enforcement, 
26 November 2018”.
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lawyer-client communication both from a subjective perspective and from 
the point of view of status, thus, the position of dependence or independ-
ence of the subject called upon to an obligation of professional secrecy. 
In short, different institutions and different degrees of protection are 
activated depending on the chosen language of translation36.
5. Looking for convergency
Whereas community law prevails, in Italy legal privilege in intellectual 
property37 has modelled the one in competition law38. 
In this context, we are witnessing, from a substantive point of view, 
the expansion of authorised persons to exercise the right of defence, the 
recognition of an obligation of professional secrecy towards them, and 
the consequent benefit of the confidential treatment of the relative cor-
respondence39; from a procedural point of view, instead, we are witnessing 
a refinement of the analysis of the relationship between the protection of 
confidential information and the discipline of professional secrecy40.
36 For a more detailed comparison, Falce, “Riservatezza”, 469.
37 In countries other than Italy, there are interesting stimuli where the European Patent Convention 
in the version that came into force in 2007 and the 2013 Agreement on the Unified Patent Court, 
together with its procedural rules, extend the obligation of professional secrecy to representatives.
38 For a more specific analysis, Falce, “Riservatezza”, 469.
39 The reference is clearly destined to the agents enrolled with the Order of Qualified Consultants 
and the Register of Qualified Industrial Property Consultants, pursuant to art. 2012 of the 
Industrial Property Code, that are subject to an obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to art. 
206 CPI (Italian code of intellectual property).
40 On such matter, the Court of Milan on March 17th 2014, specialized Business Division, with 
note by Giacinto Parisi, “Brevi note sulla tutela delle informazioni riservate nell’ambito del pro-
cedimento di descrizione”, Ill Diritto d’Autore 85, no. 4 (2014): 472; on the same note, Court of 
Milan, November 28th 2008, Les Laboratoires Servier S.A. v. Doc Generici s.r.l., in Jurisprudence 
Annotated Industrial Law 2010, 1, 83, in which the Court Judge considers that in the presence 
of confidential information, the description must be carried out only in the presence of the 
Court-appointed consultant, the parties and their respective defences, all bound to professional 
secrecy (in such sense, again, the Court of Milano, July 13th 1999 (n. 4088/1)), and the results 
of the description must remain secret in the Chancellery until further notice. On the notion of 
confidential information within the description, confidential information (on the meaning of this 
expression, see Guido Modiano, “Misure idonee a garantire la tutela delle informazioni riservate 
nel corso di descrizioni giudiziarie”, in Studi di Diritto Industriale in Onore di Adriano Vanzetti, 
Tomo II (Italy: Giuffrè Editore, 2004), 1047; also, Marco Saverio Spolidoro, “Profili processuali del 
Codice della proprietà industriale”, Il Diritto Industriale 16, no. 2 (2008): 177; and, Massimo Scuffi, 
Diritto Processuale della Proprietà Industriale ed Intellettuale: Ordinamento Amministrativo e 
Tutela Giurisdizionale (Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 2009).
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Reference is made to Chapter VI of the Italian Code of Industrial Property, 
dedicated to Professional Instruction, which with the novel of 201041 and 
201242, has first of all extended legitimacy to the representation and defence 
in court proceedings both to agents (article 201, paragraph 4) and to citi-
zens of the European Union that are entitled to practice the same profession 
in another Member State, as long as they are registered with the associa-
tion of attorneys, according to the procedures put forth by the Legislative 
Decree no. 206 of November 9, 2007 (article 201, paragraph 4b). 
This dual action did away with the preclusion prohibiting agents to 
have an audience before the Commission of Appeals for trademarks and 
patents, as a judicial office, confining the exercise of relative functions to 
the Office of Trademarks and Patents, considering them administrative 
in nature. What is more, the provision that attorneys established in other 
Member States must be registered with the Italian Association of Attorneys 
and be residents or have professional seats in Italy to exercise their profes-
sion within the Patent office has been repealed43. The cumulative effect is 
that today, agents, attorneys, and lawyers registered with their respective 
associations may represent and defend physical and legal persons in pro-
ceedings before the commission of appeals (article 202, paragraph 1) and, 
in the exercise of these functions, they are obliged to professional secrecy 
(article 206). 
It is also interesting to see that the Code includes among the causes of 
incompatibility to enrolment and therefore the exercise of a consultant 
“any employment or any public or private office, except for the employ-
ment or positions held in companies, offices or specialized services in the 
field, both independent and organized within entities or companies, and 
of teaching exercised in any form” (art. 205, paragraph 1) and then attenu-
ates the strictness of the provision, allowing their enrolment in the asso-
ciation, thus providing compatibility with the membership “of industrial 
property attorneys, wherein they carry out their activities in offices or ser-
vices organized within entities or companies, i.e. consortiums or groups 
of companies”. In this case, in fact, pursuant to article 205, paragraph 3, 
attorneys can operate exclusively in the name and on behalf of the agency 
or company on which they depend, of the businesses belonging to the 
41 Italian Legislative Decree no.131/2010.
42 Italian Legislative Decree no.1/2012, converted with amendments into law no. 27/2012.
43 See Judgment of 13 February 2003, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, 
C- 131/01, EU:C:2003:96.
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consortium or the group in which the organizations are firmly established, 
and businesses or persons that belong to agencies, businesses, groups or 
consortia within which the authorised attorney is established in systematic 
relationships of collaboration, including those of research, production and 
technological exchange. 
In other words, according to the code, authorised attorneys can exercise 
their activity within the agencies, businesses, groups and consortia whose 
statutory activity is not the exercise of consulting on intellectual property. 
In this case, their registration within the Association shall occur within 
the Industrial section and their mandate may be exercised within specific 
limits of representation of the agency or business they depend on or with 
which they hold systematic collaborative relationships. 
In doing so, the code reinforces the regime of lawyers employed by pub-
lic entities, which, unlike those of a private business, can subscribe to a 
“special” list annexed to the association of attorneys to exercise a jus pos-
tulandi limited to the causes of the entity to which they belong44. 
In this way only is it believed that lawyers and consultants fulfil the 
mission attributed to them with respect to the prerogatives enshrined in 
Community law to protect the independence of lawyers, the observance of 
professional secrecy and the need to avoid conflicts of interest45.
6. Conclusions
The above remarks confirm that Directive 2014/104/EU does not merely 
regulate the application of legal privilege within the limits and terms set 
out in European case law, but also entrusts the transposition legislator to 
reflect upon the subjective boundaries of the relevant subject matter.
As a result, a new and serious reflection on the subject is solicited by 
both the categories mentioned within the English and French versions of 
44 See article 3, paragraph 4, letter b) of Italian r.d.l no. 1578 of 27/1933, converted into Law no. 
36/1934. See, extensively, Falce, “Riservatezza”, 469.
45 In such sense, the conclusions provided by the Opinion of Advocate General Léger delivered 
on 10 July 2001, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de 
Europese Gemeenschap, C-309/99, EU:C:2001:390, 180. In order to enable lawyers to fulfil their 
“public service” mission in the sense in which it has been by me defined, the State authorities have 
given them a number of prerogatives and professional obligations. Among the latter, three charac-
teristic aspects form part of the very essence of the legal profession in all Member States, namely 
the obligations relating to the independence of the lawyer, the observance of professional secrecy 
and the need to avoid conflicts of interest.
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art. 5 of the Directive, and, above all, by the evolutionary tendencies that 
are being established in the field of intellectual property, upon which the 
private antitrust enforcement is based. 
In other words, the opportunity presented is of great value and, if fully 
grasped, could lead Member States, Italy included, to the creation of a stat-
ute of legal privilege in corporate law, in which the communications of 
in-house lawyers (perhaps granting them ad hoc mandates) and other par-
ties subject to professional secrecy, as long as they are registered with an 
association and bound by relevant regulations with respect to independ-
ence, are formally disciplined. This solution, though, is not as innovative 
as it appears. 19 OECD States require in fact in-house lawyers be licenced, 
adequately qualified, and subject to the legal profession’s rules of profes-
sional ethics and independence, in order to make their communications 
covered by the legal privilege.46
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Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e all’innovazione. Uno, nes-
suno o centomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017): 355-366.
Presti, Gaetano. “Spunti generali dal microsistema della solidarietà nella disciplina del 
danno da concorrenza”. Analisi giuridica dell’economia. Il danno alla concorrenza e 
all’innovazione. Uno, nessuno o centomila? XVI, no. 2 (2017): 437-450.
Scuffi, Massimo. Diritto processuale della proprietà industriale ed intellettuale: 
Ordinamento Amministrativo e tutela Giurisdizionale. Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 2009.
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